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 The emergence to some prominence of radical political economy from the 
mid-1960s for a decade or more witnessed significant debate over Marx’s value 
theory across committed Marxist economists, more sceptical but sympathetic 
heterodox economists, and also orthodox economists who tended to be dismissive if 
occasionally offering some admiration from the perspective of their own concerns 
(Marx as general equilibrium, growth or duality theorist). As a result, debate involved 
the nature and validity of value theory and its position within Marx’s and Marxist 
political economy as a whole. Over the past two decades, contributions from non-
Marxists to value theory have fallen away considerably. This reflects both bad news 
and good news. The bad news is, of course, that the influence and presence of Marxist 
political economy has been in decline. The good news is that current debate itself is 
richer for having moved beyond, if not universally, whether Marx’s value theory is 
valid and to address how it is to be interpreted by those who have both knowledge of 
its finer points and wish to apply them to theoretical and empirical questions. 
 
 I have been extensively engaged in these debates. For the earlier period, this 
involvement reached its peak over the period between the publishing of Fine and 
Harris (1979) and Fine (ed) (1986). After this, I was more inclined not to engage any 
further in debate as my position on the issues concerned had been aired more than 
enough times, and I felt that I had nothing new to say. And a new generation of 
scholars sympathetic to my approach had the opportunity to take it forward.1 This is 
not to deny the need to renew exposition for those encountering value theory for the 
first time, but this was accounted for by my introductory text, Marx’s Capital, first 
published in 1975, with a third edition in 1989, before being revised twice more with 
Alfredo Saad-Filho as co-author, with latest edition forthcoming.2 However, the latest 
round of debate within Marxist value theory has induced me to become involved 
again, not least initially with critique of new interpretations of the so-called 
transformation problem, Fine et al (2004).  
 
 More recently, I have been engaged in at least three different debates with 
each, as already explained, based upon much common ground, including commitment 
to value theory as opposed to disputing its validity and/or relevance. The debate with 
Jim Kincaid has run, possibly more than run, its course, Kincaid (2007, 2008 and 
2009), Fine and Saad-Filho (2003, 2008 and 2009) and Saad-Filho (2002). The debate 
with Mike Lebowitz has been abbreviated, even brought to an abrupt halt, with his 
response to me,3 Lebowitz (2003, 2006 and 2009) and Fine (2008). By contrast, the 
debate with dos Santos and Lapavitsas, around how to locate finance in light of the 
current crisis, has scarcely begun. Indeed, their most recent publications apart, dos 
Santos (2009) and Lapavitsas (2009a and b), the discussion has been confined to an 
extensive personal exchange over a two week period or so in March 2009.4  
 
 It was, however, towards the end of this exchange that I perceived an 
important connection between the debate previously engaged with Lebowitz and the 
one that was underway on finance. The connection sheds light on both debates and 
not just over method. For the latter, though, to reiterate and refine, what is at issue is 
not whether value theory is valid or not but how to locate more complex phenomenon 
in relation to value theory. With Lebowitz, in this respect, the differences have been 
more or less completely clarified. But, as will be seen, their nature and origins might 
best be understood by reference to different motivations and objectives in our 
respective works that have, nonetheless, brought us into conflict.  
 
 This paper begins, then, in the next section with the lessons I would draw from 
the debate with Lebowitz. These are that, at a more complex level of analysis, for both 
labour markets and the value of labour power, each is fragmented and determined in 
distinct ways, across segments of wage labour and items of consumption, 
respectively. Such a stance is not at the expense of emphasis upon class relations and 
struggle, nor the determining role of production (properly understood) as Lebowitz 
would interpret my position. Rather it concerns how to locate class struggle and 
production when addressing different segments of the labour market and how the so-
called moral and historical elements in the value of labour power are to be understood 
and explained in moving from the abstract to the concrete. At the core of the dispute 
with dos Santos and Lapavitsas would appear to be a different set of issues. This is 
whether “financial expropriation”, as they term it, is a legitimate way of addressing 
the rise of (abnormal) profitability through provision of financial services (to the 
working class). In contrast to them, I suggest not, and that, as an aspect of 
financialisation, the contemporary provision of financial services is better understood 
as the integration of such services with interest bearing capital (for which the rate of 
profit is not equalised). Significantly, this opposing view draws in part upon the 
insights gained from the debate with Lebowitz.  
 
There is some satisfaction, from the point of view of undertaking research, in 
seeing these two debates come and fit together like pieces of a political economy 
jigsaw. And this is a product of being in dispute with those with whom more is shared 
than contested. In this light, the paper concludes with an appeal for open debate over 
these issues. We need to draw critically upon past contributions, neither unduly 
politicising intellectual endeavours nor neglecting their relevance for addressing the 
nature of contemporary capitalism. At a time when neo-liberalism is demonstrably in 
crisis materially and ideologically, and working people come under assault as 
recession takes hold, sympathy for them and contempt for the exploitation attached to 
finance can, to a great extent, be taken for granted from a variety of perspectives. It is 
inevitable, and desirable, that these perspectives should be contested amongst one 
another, if not at the expense of common goals. 
 
Determining the Value of Labour Power 
 
 For Lebowitz, possibly the key issue is to emphasise how insufficient attention 
has been given to class struggle, especially at the point of production, both by Marx 
himself and Marxism, and that this is crucial in understanding the dynamics of 
capitalism in general and of the evolution of the rate of exploitation. For him, Capital 
is an account of what capital does, and not how labour resists and, thereby, influences 
outcomes. This leads him to put forward the concept of the “degree of separation”, to 
incorporate the notion that capitalists must divide and rule workers in order to prevent 
them from appropriating the surplus produced. The degree of separation is also 
decisive in determining the extent to which the productivity increase associated with 
capital accumulation is appropriated by capitalists (as relative surplus value) or by 
workers in defence of the value of labour power (which would imply higher levels of 
real consumption). 
 
There is an issue, here, of whether this fairly represents Marx and Marxism in 
terms of the neglect of class struggle, especially in light of the labour process 
literature that has, admittedly gone into decline over the period of neo-liberalism, 
most notably through the twin assault on industrial relations and sociology (by human 
relations and resource management) in particular and political economy in general. 
But my starting point has been different. It has been to address more closely the 
determination of the value of labour-power, something that has been sorely neglected 
in the Marxist tradition despite its importance, with almost absolute reliance upon 
Marx’s own reference to moral and historical elements without going into further 
elaboration. Even on this narrow basis, however, there have been two different 
approaches (although they are perceived to be equivalent within a static equilibrium 
framework). One is to refer to the value of labour power as a value as with variable 
capital, most immediately as a quantity of money, with the value of wages oscillating 
around the value of labour power in practice. The other is to refer to a bundle of goods 
as standard, and their corresponding socially necessary labour-time of production. 
 
These are, of course, very different conceptualisations of the value of labour 
power as is sharply revealed by any increase in productivity. The first would lead to a 
reduction in the rate of profit since the wage as a bundle of use values would increase 
in proportion as values of commodities decrease other than labour power itself. The 
second would be at the opposite extreme, with the value of labour power reducing in 
proportion to productivity increase as the wage bundle remains unchanged. For 
Lebowitz, the degree of separation is decisive in determining where the outcome lies 
between these two extremes. 
 
My position is different and differently motivated and tends to view 
Lebowitz’s stance as bordering upon a tautology – the more the working class is 
united in struggle as represented in the degree of separation, the more it has to gain 
from productivity increase. There is also a dual aspect involved in my approach, 
corresponding to the two different ways of interpreting the value of labour power – as 
values or as use values. The first aspect concerns differentiation across labour 
markets. Without going into detail, there are a number different economic and social 
processes that differentiate the creation and occupation of positions within the 
production process (and the labour market more generally), and these flow in part 
from the imperatives of capitalist accumulation itself in terms of skills, hierarchies, 
and oppositional and organisational conflict in response to reorganisation of the work 
process. Such differentiation, or segmentation as it is usually termed, is variously 
situated within and across firms, sectors, and occupations. At the very least, this 
means that the form taken by the value of labour power is not simply a standard 
enjoyed by all, but one that is determined according to the processes of, and responses 
to, the restructuring of employment. The value of labour power is not even an average 
from which there are divergences either side, in anything other than a numerical 
sense. Rather, the value of labour power is the result of a deeply structured and 
differentiated (re)positioning of the workforce in its economic and social relations as 
well as in its more narrowly defined rewards in terms of wage differentiation. Indeed, 
as argued in Fine (1998), labour market segmentation is not merely a matter of 
different segments of the workforce but differentially organised functioning within 
those segments 
 
Before proceeding to the second aspect of how the value of labour power is to 
be interpreted, it is worth emphasising on the first aspect alone how difference with 
Lebowitz is generated. We do agree that I place class struggle at a lower level of 
abstraction than he does. For he sees it as located at the level of capital and labour as a 
whole, with the degree of separation reflecting, in aggregate or balance, the struggle at 
this level albeit made up of the varieties of more complex struggles across the 
economy. As a result, I am interpreted as denying the primacy of class struggle, and 
of deeming it to be contingent rather than necessary. 
 
This is not so for the following reasons. First, it is necessary to unpick the 
notion of abstraction into at least two different aspects5 which often, but do not 
always, coincide.6 One is the logical movement from more abstract or simple concepts 
to the more complex and concrete. We cannot have profit or price before we have 
surplus value and value, for example. The other is the causal relations between 
categories or factors. Here, irrespective of the causal status of class struggle, we can 
identify it as being differentially determined within production processes, across the 
economy, and in social and ideological contestation as well. Again, this is not at issue 
as could not be put clearer by Lebowitz (2009, p. ??): 
 
I have no difficulty thinking about individual capitalists trying to divide and 
thereby weaken the workers they employ by, for example, using racism and 
sexism or by moving to greenfields or regions where trade unionism is 
constrained if not illegal; nor, are we lacking for examples of particular 
workers who struggle to reduce the degree of separation among themselves in 
complex and differentiated ways. Accordingly, there would seem to be a 
prima facie case for accepting that the degree of separation among workers 
(this inner abstraction meant to capture the balance of class forces) is realized 
through the daily struggles of capitalists and workers. 
 
But it is the last sentence where we depart analytical company. For this inner 
abstraction is not one that is reproduced through material processes, and so is ideal. It 
is, to coin a phrase, a sack of potatoes of struggles that may or may not have any 
reinforcing solidarity so that there is no reason why the degree of separation should be 
reproduced as an abstract (that is simple, underlying) category. This is quite distinct 
from the determining role played by class struggle. Indeed, it is precisely because of 
the separation of the working class (and divide and rule across the organisation of 
production) emphasised by Lebowitz that means the degree of separation is both in 
form and essence, a complex category. There is a difference here with the rate of 
surplus value, which can legitimately be taken to be an aggregate (and simple) social 
category. For it does offer a “centre of gravity” around which there tends to be 
equalisation. This derives precisely from the unity displayed, inadvertently, by capital 
in its total circulation, in which capital would move to wherever individual rates of 
exploitation were higher than normal, even whilst reproducing a differentiated 
workforce. But there is no such equalising tendency amongst labour market 
conditions themselves (just as what makes for differences in labour markets in one 
place does not tend to have them replicated elsewhere – as if militancy were evened 
out across the economy by labour as opposed to capital, and otherwise there would be 
no discrimination in the labour market, for example, by gender and race and so on). 
 
 The second aspect in the determination of the value of labour power concerns 
the wage as a bundle of use values, commonly perceived as a material standard of 
living. Here, I have emphasised three points. First, the way in which that standard is 
established is different from one commodity to another (and in relation to elements of 
economic and social reproduction that are not produced by capital directly whether 
provided by the state or in commodity form outside of capitalist production). More 
specifically, I have argued that the wage bundle is comprised of a number of separate 
systems of provision, such as the food, health, housing and transport systems, with 
these complemented by what I have termed public sector systems of provision, Fine 
and Leopold (1992), Fine (2002, 2005a and b,  2007c and 2009a), and Bayliss and 
Fine (eds) (2007). 
 
 Second, within each system of provision, norms are established which are 
neither the same for all nor even an average, but a distinctive mode of provision with 
corresponding incidence of levels and quality of consumption across different social 
groups. So, the nature of the moral and historical element is different both within and 
between different items within the consumption bundle.  
 
 Third, then, the way in which the different systems of provision establish the 
moral and historical element is certainly contingent upon class struggle, and upon the 
overall value of labour power as it evolves over time. But it is not reducible to, even if 
stretched beyond class conflict at the point of production, as a causal role is played by 
elements along each of the systems of provision as a whole, along which (in the links 
between production and consumption) influence is exerted upon the levels and 
incidence of norms for consumption.7 Thus, whilst the value of labour power is given 
at any moment as an abstract and simple determinant, as accumulation proceeds, so 
the reproduction and transformation of that value of labour power is determined at the 
more complex level of differentially segmented and functioning labour markets and 
the differentiated systems of provision attached to differentiated standards of 
consumption. 
 
 In short, the moral and historical element in the value of labour power as a 
material standard of living – as opposed to a level of social necessary labour-time – is 
not determined by class struggle alone, not by production alone, not by conflict 
between capital and labour alone, and is differentially determined across different 
elements of consumption (and labour markets). Consequently, it follows that, if the 
degree of separation is taken as the measure of the extent to which productivity 
increase is appropriated by the working class, it is an extremely complex and concrete 
determinant and not one that is logically located at a high level of abstraction such as 
the value of labour itself around which, to reiterate, the circulation of (surplus) value 
revolves and, from which, the complex determinants of the moral and historical 




 These issues seem far removed from those posed by dos Santos and Lapavitsas 
for whom the goal is to specify the nature of recent developments in finance in light 
of the current crisis. Moreover, in contrast to Lebowitz who is more theoretical in 
substance, their work has been predominantly concerned with the empirical changes 
in finance in general and in banking in particular. The purpose here is less to question 
or add to their empirical account and more to examine the way in which it is and is to 
be located theoretically.  
 
 Nonetheless, they do offer a particular analytical angle on the changes in 
banking practices. This is that, especially with an expanded role of credit in relation to 
workers through provision of personal financial services, there has been the 
emergence of “financial expropriation”. Indeed, “The financial sector has become 
capable of extracting profit directly out of wages and salaries, a process called 
financial expropriation”, from abstract for Lapavitsas (2009b).8 I am not convinced 
that what is meant by this is clear from the papers that are publicly available, and this 
has not necessarily been helped by an initial use of the term exploitation in earlier 
drafts with a subsequent shift towards expropriation. This was intended to mark for 
them a clarified distinction from the exploitation associated with the production of 
surplus value or in its distribution as normal profit-making.  
 
Some degree of precision does appear to have been realised, however, in my 
understanding of what they mean. For them, banking capital has been able 
systematically to appropriate, as part of the process of reproduction of the working 
class under neoliberalism, a portion of wage revenue at higher than normal profit, and 
this takes place more or less independently of the processes of production and 
circulation that generate and distribute surplus value in the normal course of events. A 
number of arguments are offered in support of this position, but they also present 
difficulties even on their own terms. 
  
First, for example, the parallel, precedent even, is drawn with usury and 
trucking. Thus, for Lapavitsas (2009b), emphasis added:9 
These practices are reminiscent of the age-old tradition of usury, but they are 
now performed by the formal financial system. Financial expropriation 
represents the generalisation on a social scale of financial practices that 
resemble trucking and usury. It has allowed financial institutions to boost their 
profits independently of surplus value generated by the indifferently 
performing sphere of production. This is a constituent element of 
financialisation.  
The problem, as in a sense partially noted, is that usury and trucking are proto-, even 
pre-capitalist, highly individualised, not open to generalisation and the exception 
rather than the rule. Is it possible that usury and trucking can be general across 
workers in the context of developed capitalism?  
 
 Second, appeal is made to the idea that, for the rise of financialisation in the 
form of direct financial expropriation, “the deeper causes must be sought in 
developments in the forces and relations of production”, Lapavitsas (2009b). For the 
forces, the suggestion is made that “the roots of financialisation during the last three 
decades are to be found … in the technological revolution in information and 
telecommunications”. This is subsequently finessed in terms of slow productivity 
growth across both industrial and financial sectors over the period of financialisation. 
But, apart from an undue flavour of technological determinism at most tempered by 
appeals to deregulation (that applies equally to industry over the period concerned), 
there is no reason why such a shift in technology in and of itself should either lead to 
a change in the proportion of financial activity (the more productive sector could 
simply decline in weight) nor in its extension. In addition, in this respect at least, the 
evolution of industrial and financial sectors is unduly, if not inevitably, treated as 
independent of one another rather than as symbiotic in mutual reliance upon the 
production of surplus value (although, of course, that independence is mooted in 
terms of financial expropriation). In other words, the technology as productive forces 
argument is unconvincing (although this is not the same thing as saying that such 
material developments have no influence or relative impact). To put it metaphorically, 
it is as if electronic banking has turned us all into proto-serfs in which we deduct a 
part of our wages and hand them over, directly or indirectly, to the banking system to 
source their super-normal profits. 
 
 Third, there must be similar reservations over reliance upon transformed 
relations of production in explaining financial expropriation. For Lapavitsas (2009b), 
this seems to refer to “the deregulation of labour and financial markets, with the 
attendant intensification of labour” or, at greater length, “an associated shift in the 
balance of power against organised labour. Deregulation of labour includes reduced 
protection of employment with parallel use of unemployment as disciplining device. 
The composition of the labour force has also changed through entry of part-time 
workers and women, the two often being the same. Flexible employment, invasion of 
private time by work, unpaid labour, and intensified labour have characterised the 
period”.  Once again, the problem here is that there is no reason why any of this 
should be particularly associated either with the expansion of finance or with its 
particular forms, especially expropriation. 
 
 Nonetheless, even if to be fair as offering only a partial explanation with 
continuing gaps, Lapavitsas (2009b) has relied upon the idea (and undisputed 
empirical outcome) of the asymmetrical development between industry and finance as 
the basis on which financialisation in general, and financial expropriation in 
particular, have emerged. Fourth, this appeal to asymmetry, however, is very different 
from the one highlighted in earlier papers in reference to a distinct aspect of the 
relations of production. Here, the argument around asymmetry is much more one of 
the individualised working class consumer forced into relations of usury with the 
banking sector in order to access the credit necessary to fund consumption. Such 
arguments do not differ much from those that would be offered by the information-
theoretic (market imperfection) approach to credit markets. The problem here, though, 
is that, as an individualised account of asymmetry, the advantage to either side is 
contingent. And there are plenty of consumers (workers even) who take advantage of 
the credit relations on offer. I count myself as one of them, and suspect Paulo and 
Costas do as well. This raises doubts again over the extent to which financial 
expropriation can be generalised as they have understood it in terms of deductions 
from the value of labour power, see below.  
 
Fifth, though, there is a potential appeal to a deeper understanding of 
asymmetry in drawing the contrast between the credit relations by banking with 
corporations as opposed to workers. As dos Santos (2009) puts it: 
 
In contrast to the relationship between corporations and banks, these activities 
bear the mark of the profound social inequality between wage earners seeking 
to secure future consumption and banks seeking to maximise profits, as 
glaring and arguably systematic disadvantages to the former. It may be 
usefully understood as possessing an exploitative content. 
 
No one doubts that corporations have different relationships with banks than workers 
for all sorts of reasons of material practices and customary position and networks, and 
so on. But why should these leave corporations free of the mercy of exploitative credit 
relations? Here, an answer is provided in terms of heavy emphasis upon the growing 
financial independence of the non-financial from financial corporations, not least 
through self-funding and own engagement in financial operations. This is stressed 
throughout their work in order both to place financial expropriation in a more 
prominent position and to liberate the Marxist (and other) traditions, in the spirit of 
Hilferding, from the false notion of increasing integration of industry and finance 
under the dominance of finance.  
 
 But their own argument fails to move to a more systemic level of 
understanding (being based on asymmetry between agents in circulation) and is beset 
by one major problem irrespective of the other issues raised above or below and, to a 
large extent, independent of how they are resolved. This is how to explain the 
persistence, over such a long period as the era of financialisation, of both financial 
expropriation and, whether accepting this specification or not, the abnormally high 
profits as a consequence within the personal banking sector. To put it bluntly, why has 
capital not flowed into the sector of personal finance and reduced profitability to 
normal levels. This is particularly salient in view of the stance taken by dos Santos 
and Lapavitsas on the relative independence of, and capacity for, not only self-finance 
but deployment of financial instruments within the corporate sector more generally. 
Given this, and abnormal profits in personal finance, the way would appear to be open 
for abnormal profits to be eroded to normal levels by competitive entry of other 
sources of credit thereby, presumably, eliminating financial expropriation across the 
working class, not least as normal profits would be expected across all capitals 
whether working within production or exchange.  
 
 I will offer an alternative explanation for these abnormal profits later. But, 
before doing so, I want to return to the issue of the value of labour power. I was 
concerned over whether financial expropriation was perceived by dos Santos and 
Lapavitsas to be due to a lower value of labour power (and hence an extra 
appropriation of surplus value) or a deduction from it (an appropriation of a share of 
wages). The latter is their intent. But, from the perspective of my own understanding 
of the value of labour power, not least in light of debate with Lebowitz, if there is a 
structured and persistent, if not permanent, deduction from wages, this does imply 
that its moral and historical element has been redefined.  To emphasise what has 
previously been laid out, this is not simply a matter of the level of money wages and 
the value and use values that it represents, and the differential distribution of these 
across the working class, but also the mode of delivery of the value of labour power 
both in terms of money forms and use values (recalling that the value of labour power 
is attached to the economic and social reproduction of the working class and is not 
purely a matter of wages received and spent).  
 
Now, if we take the evidence from the United State of relatively stagnant real 
wages over an extended period of decades but a continuation in the rise of living 
standards (through credit at the individual level and balance of trade deficits funded 
by other countries’ dollar reserves at the macro-level), then it follows that there has 
been a shift in the form taken by the moral and historical elements that make up the 
value of labour power, quite distinct from its level. Initially, irrespective of dispute 
with dos Santos and Lapavitsas, this seemed to be decisive empirical evidence in the 
debate with Lebowitz over the level of abstraction at which to locate the degree of 
separation. For the determinants of the value of labour power appeared to derive less 
from (declining) working class solidarity and more from the rise of personal finance 
in the sphere of exchange although, of course, that working class consumption has 
been sustained in this form is extraordinarily important for forms of struggle during a 
(credit) crisis. 
 
But matters became more complex in light of the position adopted by dos 
Santos and Lapavitsas in which, logically correctly from their perspective, my 
exchanges with Lebowitz should be dismissed as being completely irrelevant since, 
for them, financial expropriation has nothing to do with the determination of value of 
labour power, which is taken as given by other factors, with banking’s provision of 
personal services simply appropriating a part of that value through abnormal profits. 
In this respect, I referred to the later versions of their papers to appear in Historical 
Materialism, and one by Dymski (2009) that was to accompany them, in order that I 
might be able to gain a better understanding of financial expropriation.  
 
Significantly, to put it in other terms, dos Santos and Lapavitsas would appear 
to deny, or to put aside as irrelevant for their purposes, that there are established 
moral and historical elements in the way in which credit realises the value of labour 
power. But, paradoxically, they and Dymski refer to one another for further 
elaboration of financial expropriation, and it is with Dymski’s account that we 
encounter further difficulties. For he is concerned with the way in which sub-prime 
emerged as a result of enforced inclusion of redlined racially segregated housing into 
private ownership with corresponding over-selling of unsustainable and dishonest 
mortgages, their incorporation into sold-on derivatives, and the resultant collapse of 
the financial system once a combination of falling housing prices and defaulted 
payments arose, as they inevitably did.  
 
But, for the dos Santos and Lapavitsas story, this raises serious obstacles as a 
general account of financial expropriation. This is so for two very transparent reasons, 
both to do with generality. The first is that it is specific to a particular section of the 
housing market that was previously excluded from mortgaging by action of lenders 
themselves. The second is that it is a reflection of systemic racism in this respect. The 
point is that neither of these is characteristic of the housing market as a whole or the 
extension of credit as a whole. Irrespective of whether the attempt to break down the 
barriers to private (mortgaged) ownership of housing in previously ghettoised 
neighbourhoods involves what might be termed financial expropriation or not, it does 
not serve as an exemplary illustration of the more general argument concerning the 
extension of credit to the working class as a whole across all items of consumption. 
Similarly, sub-prime as a whole, whatever its role in causing and triggering the 
current financial crisis is unlikely to serve as an ideal example of financial 
expropriation. 
 
By adopting this stance, I was now driven to extend such insights further into 
the earlier, and previously separate, debate around the value of labour power with 
Lebowitz. For, whether accepting or not that the role and forms of credit around wage 
revenue form a part of its moral and historical elements, it is striking how 
differentially credit plays a role both within particular sectors of consumption and 
between them. Dos Santos and Lapavitsas are absolutely correct to point to the extent 
to which items of working class consumption have been commercialised through 
privatisation and the like. As Lapavitsas (2009b) puts it: 
 
These developments owe much to the withdrawal of public provision across 
goods and services comprising the real wage: housing, health, education, 
pensions, and so on. Financial institutions, consequently, have been able to 
extract profits directly and systematically out of wages and salaries. 
 
But, according to the system of provision approach, the (shifting) role of credit 
relations in serving working class consumption will be differentiated from one item to 
the next both in terms of its level and nature of presence and by its impact within each 
system itself. You do not, for example, buy a house on a credit card whilst, on the 
other hand, it is very hard to hire a car without one. 
 
 This has particular implications for understanding the role of credit in the 
housing market, and for the “financial expropriation” which Dymski examines and on 
which dos Santos and Lapavitsas approvingly draw. For, significantly, my own, more 
general, system of provision approach, was inspired to some degree by work on the 
UK housing system.10 In this, and it is known by all, the role of credit (and 
mortgages) is heavily linked to the appreciation in house prices, which is itself then 
underpinned by inflated land prices as well as the insertion of intermediaries in the 
buying and selling of housing, with a corresponding impact on the provisioning of 
housing whether in new build or repair.  
 
The details of this need not detain us, and they will be different in one location 
(within and across countries) as opposed to another. But what this does mean is that 
the provision of housing is necessarily intimately related, unlike most other 
commodities, to the role of landed property by which is meant the terms and 
conditions of access to land (and the housing located upon it). The economic form 
taken by such a relationship is usually rent.11 It is also highly contingent upon how the 
construction industry and other agents in the process are integrally related and 
structured in the social reproduction of housing and the social construction of the built 
environment (what is redlined and what is not, and why, for example). In case of the 
pressure upon financial institutions to grant mortgage finance to previously redlined 
areas, as reported in Dymski (2009), this implies a shift in the nature of landed 
property attached to the corresponding housing, with enhanced access to owner-
occupation within redlined areas as opposed to dependence on slum landlords. Insofar 
as “interest” accrues to finance companies out of arranging those mortgages, it is at 
least in part and potentially a form of rent that derives from the capital gains attached 
to the housing (and can only continue as long as such capital gains accrue as well as 
mortgage repayments). 
 
Two important implications follow from this. First is the potential conflation 
of economic categories in which it is necessary to probe a little deeper into the source 
of forms of revenue than in the way they present themselves. As dos Santos and 
Lapavitsas have correctly emphasised, the proximate source of banking profits out of 
provision of personal finance are the deductions from wages. But, as suggested, these 
may merely be the way in which capital gains in housing are passed on through the 
wage-earner. Some understanding of this may be offered by way of analogy. The 
state, for example, differentially taxes each wage earner according to a number of 
criteria through deduction from gross wages. Does this mean that the state exploits or 
appropriates from the wage-earner? The answer is no for, as argued in Fine and Harris 
(1979), all taxes are paid out of surplus value as the value of labour power is 
determined by what the wage earner receives, not by what is not received, although 
this does make for a change in forms of conflict over real wages as labour seeks to 
defend or promote them (against taxes and inflation).12  
 
The point here is not to make an exaggerated virtue out of false appearances 
and to look for a deeper reality behind every empirical outcome. But it is important to 
acknowledge that there is something different about housing markets and, 
correspondingly, the credit markets to which they are attached. This is strikingly 
revealed by dos Santos’ (2009) most apt characterisation of the current crisis, with 
which he opens (the later version of) his piece: 
 
By many historical measures the current financial crisis is without precedent. 
It originated from neither an industrial crisis nor an equity market crash. It was 
precipitated by the simple fact that increasing numbers of largely black, Latino 
and working-class white families in the US have been defaulting on their 
mortgages. 
 
What is implicit here is that it is housing, and not other commodities that form part of 
working class consumption, which precipitated the crisis. This is to return to the 
theme of the nature and determinants of the value of labour power, the differentiation 
between the systems of provision that underpin working class consumption to which 
credit relations are differentially attached. It is - at least currently, although the same 
may have been said about such housing in the past right up to the crisis itself - 
inconceivable that speculation in financialised working class consumption of 
education or health could have been at the epicentre of the crisis (or even oil and food, 
both items of working class consumption and subject over the most recent period to 
extremes of speculative volatility).  
 
Yet these are all rounded up into the same undifferentiated category of 
financial expropriation. Consider credit card (ab)use. Here, once again, there is an 
enormous difference, within the working class and consumers more generally, as has 
long been recognised by those who have campaigned against usurious interest rate 
exploitation of a minority (and there is a simple failure of many of those at the 
extremes of exploitation to manage their financial affairs efficiently in some sense).13 
An interesting dynamic has been involved in this around the formal/informal 
structural division between those who are creditworthy and those who are not, in 
which informal lines of credit which are far more expensive (usurious) occupy the 
space left by the formal. But such informal lines of credit are increasingly integrated 
with, and even absorbed within the formal, and are contingent upon (and calculated 
as) a balance between higher charges and higher defaults. We, who use credit 
responsibly, pay in overheads for the defaults of others who are, nonetheless, even 
more penalised than we are. So, if there are abnormal profits in the (consumer) credit 
sector, it is because of this systemic structure and dynamic in which there is some 
averaging of gains and losses taken as a whole, albeit with differential performance 
across individual agencies on both sides of the market.  
 
Yet, as already emphasised, this offers no explanation for why such credit 
should command abnormal as opposed to normal profits. And, it is not simply a 
matter of the status of the notion of financial expropriation but how this relates more 
fundamentally to the Marxist theory of finance. Dos Santos and Lapavitsas do take 
some trouble to locate themselves in this respect, not least with regard to the 
favourable view of Hilferding even if his characterisation and influence are perceived 
to be outdated in view of the current relative independence and lack of subordination 
of industry to finance, whatever their past significance. But what is strikingly absent 
is the relative lack of grounding of their analysis in the theory of finance, and 
corresponding concepts, put forward by Marx himself. In this respect, I was unsure to 
what extent they saw themselves as breaking with Marx (and/or my own 
interpretation of him in this respect).  
 
In particular, I would put forward the following propositions concerning 
Marx’s theory of finance, each to be found elaborated and justified in more detail in 
my earlier work. First, Marx divides the capital functioning within exchange into two 
sorts, merchant capital and interest bearing capital. It is easiest to begin with merchant 
capital as it typically involves trading, such as retailing and wholesaling (or 
commercial capital), and, apart from its location within the sphere of exchange, is 
logically defined by its not producing (surplus) value whilst being subject to 
competitive entry and exit just like industrial capital. As a consequence, it is subject to 
tendency to equalised profitability. Further, such merchant capital is not confined 
simply to buying and selling but also involves a variety of credit and other monetary 
relations and functions which, nonetheless, tend to attract equal profitability. For 
convenience, I refer, to some extent in parallel with Marx, to such non-trading 
merchant capital, as money dealing capital, MDC. Once again, it is a logical category 
defined by the necessity of circulation for economic reproduction but in which the 
corresponding activities are undertaken by what is possibly a specialised capital.  
 
Second, by contrast, interest bearing capital, IBC, involves the borrowing and lending 
of money capital for the purposes of making an advance in pursuit of the production 
of surplus value. It potentially earns interest as a result, with a simple division of 
surplus value between such interest and “profit of enterprise” that is distributed across 
capital subject to rate of profit equalisation. Once again, IBC is a logical category, 
signifying that the competitive accumulation of capital is mediated by access to 
money capital for the purposes of producing surplus value. The division between 
profit and interest is not predetermined by the value system as such but by the 
outcome of the accumulation process, both in terms of how much surplus value is 
realised in practice (as the advance of money capital is a pre-condition not a guarantee 
of successful accumulation) and how it is divided with industrial (and merchant) 
capital. This division bears no relation as such to the determination of the rate of 
interest. Nonetheless, differences between rates of interest in borrowing and lending 
and fees, etc, incurred in circulation are mechanisms through which IBC appropriates 
interest. So the surplus value appropriated as interest by IBC, as mentioned, is 
variable and not pre-determined by the value system just as the surplus value 
produced by labour power is variable.  
 
Third, by the same token, this does not mean that the division is not subject to 
systematic forces and factors such as the nature and rhythm of the accumulation 
process. Logically, the capacity to appropriate surplus value as interest derives not 
simply from IBC as a logical category but in its role as the lever of competition in 
capital accumulation in which IBC is differentially situated in relation to itself as 
opposed to industrial and merchant capital. A financial institution may be willing to 
lend to an industrialist to compete with another in the same sector but is less likely to 
set up another financial institution to do so and compete with itself. This does not 
mean there is no competition within or with the financial sector, only that it is of a 
different order than for the rest of the economy. And this is precisely why the interest 
attached to IBC is not competed away to the normal rate of profit. 
 
Fourth, because each of the categories discussed is logically derived, their real 
existence must be addressed through closer theoretical and empirical analysis, 
discovering the reproduction of the real but abstract in thought at more complex 
levels. For, in practice, the functioning of IBC and MDC (and commercial capital for 
that matter) are inextricably integrated with one another (like constant and variable 
capital, or absolute and relative surplus value, or the three types of rent) in the sphere 
of circulation, most notably in the market for loanable money capital (LMC, a 
category deployed by Marx to signify the co-existence of the two in money markets) 
where, in principle, all idle money is placed for the purposes of borrowing and 
lending irrespective of its origins and destinations.  
 
Fifth, it follows that the real existence of, and distinction between, IBC and 
MDC are not entirely the consequence of the intentions of those engaging in 
corresponding activities as outcomes are contingent upon the movement of capital as 
a whole. Historically, financial institutions have emerged to cover the specialised 
functions associated with the separate categories of capital within exchange. But, and 
this is crucial, even in a world in which there is absolute regulatory or de facto 
division between investment and retail banking (for want of better terms), concrete 
outcomes do not correspond to their distinct spheres of operation either individually 
or in toto. An advance of IBC that fails will, nonetheless, expand commercial credit 
and realise surplus value for others out of the expenditure of the constant and variable 
capital advanced. On the other hand, state expenditure, on pensions for example, or 
credit extended for personal consumption will potentially realise surplus value in 
commodities purchased, underpinning the capacity to sustain surplus value 
appropriated by corresponding IBC. 
 
Sixth, it follows that what is or is not IBC or MDC is only loosely constrained 
by the particular functions involved, and depends upon how corresponding capitals 
are situated within the accumulation and circulation of capital as a whole. Marx 
himself worried over this in terms of interrogating the relationship between the real 
and fictitious accumulation of capital, something which cannot be (pre-)determined 
by the capitals themselves. He also addressed the issue in the slightly different 
context, of merchant capital, of whether transport of commodities is a productive or 
unproductive activity, something which can only be determined by the way in which 
such capitals are differentially attached to industrial as opposed to merchant capital.  
 
 Seventh, then, this implies that the issue is not whether IBC and MDC are 
empirically separate or not to a greater or lesser degree but how they are articulated 
concretely. In addition, this very much involves the extent to which the different 
fraction of capitals appropriate, or are attached to, activities that might otherwise fall 
under the command of others. Do industrialists access their own finance, transport, 
marketing, etc? Or, at the opposite extreme, are more general activities associated 
with capital in exchange falling under the command of, or being integrated with, IBC? 
 
 Eighth, the current era of financialisation is precisely one in which there has 
been not only a disproportionate expansion of capital in exchange, through extensive 
and intensive proliferation of financial derivatives but also the extension of finance 
into ever more areas of economic and social reproduction, of which personal finance 
is a leading example. But at this point, I would appear to begin to depart company 
with dos Santos and Lapavitsas. For, in my view, such financialisation is consistent 
with the application of Marx’s method and categories as outlined above, with an 
understanding based upon acknowledging the increasing shift of capitalist activity 
along the productive, commercial, money dealing, interest-bearing continuum, as well 
as a heavy degree of hybridity across these. In other words, an increasing range of 
activities have come under the auspices of IBC, not least sub-prime. As a result, it 
does become possible, at least in principle, to explain why abnormal profits should be 
able to persist in personal finance since this has become increasingly attached to IBC 
as opposed to merchant capital.  
 
 In contrast, dos Santos and Lapavitsas perceive financial expropriation as an 
empirically/historically/structurally/systematically new process (usury and trucking 
apart) and as a deduction from wages but without explaining why financialisation 
does not reduce such expropriation to normal levels of profitability. Instead, they 
would appear to argue that the banking capital involved is distinctive in and of itself 
and, therefore, not reducible to the articulation of IBC and MDC, etc. This seems to 
depend for them upon further theoretical and empirical work, although I would 
suggest that all of the empirical evidence that they bring to bear is consistent with, 




 As mentioned at the outset, the debates covered here are ones between those 
who share in common a commitment to Marxist value theory. In the past, such debate 
has occasionally been marred by two flaws. On the one hand, there can be a failure to 
engage with and absorb adequately the literature of the past, both from Marx himself 
and his interpreters. Whilst it is always necessary for successive generations of 
political economists to re-learn and re-interpret what has gone before, it is as well to 
learn from the mistakes as well as the achievements of the past. In case of finance, it 
is understandable, in light of the current crisis and the relative demise of Marxist 
political economy over the last few decades, that the need to respond to the crisis 
should outweigh the capacity to do so. In this respect, open and honest debate 
situating itself in relation to Marx’s categories is imperative, reflecting the spirit 
within which this contribution is offered (and similarly in the past on the same topic 
as in debate between Panico (1980 and 1988) and Fine (1985/86 and 1988) albeit in 
very different circumstances).   
 
 The second flaw in value theory debate has been an undue presumption that 
appropriate position in this holds the key to political stance, and corresponding 
reformism or ultra-leftism necessarily flows from incorrect alternatives. This is 
unconvincing for a number of reasons, not least the divorce between theory and 
practice and how the two are, or are not brought together. In terms of this pair of 
debates, Lebowitz might appear to hold the more radical position than me in view of 
his emphasis on class, production and conflict as the key determinants, whereas dos 
Santos and Lapavitsas seem to be less radical in emphasising expropriation in 
exchange and the prospects of reducing this without touching production (hardly 
controversial these days given the general condemnation of finance as parasitical and 
dysfunctional). Nonetheless, presumably, they would see exploitation and 
expropriation as complementary and to be engaged as mobilisation permits with the 
former the more fundamental. My own stance is attuned to each of these positions and 
more, by insisting upon the specificity of labour market and consumer good 
attachments to broader factors (for the latter where finance has increasingly 
intervened), and these may be decisive in organising for progressive change. 
 
 Finally, my position also has relevance for understanding the nature of 
contemporary capitalism, and it differs from that of dos Santos and Lapavitsas 
(although I suspect these differences do not derive as such from those on financial 
expropriation). As argued elsewhere in some detail, the relationship between 
financialisation and neo-liberalism is direct, with the former underpinning the 
persistence of the latter through different phases and in contradictory tension between 
rhetoric, scholarship, policy in practice and representation of reality, Fine (2009a and 
b). In other words, financialisation is (the short definition of) neo-liberalism, not as 
Lapavitsas (2009b) would merely have it that, “neo-liberalism has acted as midwife of 
financialised capitalism”. This does, however, require that financialisation be 
understood as also incorporating the shifting appropriation of activity across the 
different fractions of capital, again in contrast to the view that is “to associate 
financialisation with a change in the balance between production and circulation”. 
Further, nor is it simply that financialisation “reflects the continuing difficulties that 
production has faced during this period”. On the contrary, as argued in Fine (2007a), 
financialisation is itself a major causal factor in low levels of real accumulation and in 






 Won-Hee Cho, Soo Kim, Costas Lapavitsas, Chai-on Lee, Stavros Mavroudeas, 
Dimitris Milonakis, and Alfredo Saad-Filho all undertook PhDs under my supervision 
on topics on or closely related to value theory, and each has made significant 
contributions to the literature on this topic and more. Significantly, the last of these 
theses was completed in 1994 and, only recently, have I taken on any new value 
theorists as research students, reflecting a previous lack of supply rather than demand! 
2
 But see also Fine (1997, 2001, 2003, and 2004) and Fine et al (2009). 
 3
 Despite the title of his closing rejoinder! 
4
 It should be observed that I find the empirical importance of the intervention of 
capital into the circulation of wage revenue that they highlight to be compelling and 
of enormous importance to the evolution of my own thinking whilst we may differ 
over how this should be analytically located. 
5
 In addition, there are differences in the order of exposition and of investigation.  
6
 This is more fully explored in the debate with Kincaid with, for example, the law of 
the tendency of the rate of profit more abstract but of equal causal status to the 
counteracting tendencies (since both are systematic consequences of accumulation 
and production of relative surplus value). 
7
 A fourth point concerns the attachment of a cultural system to each system of 
provision through which the meaning of consumption is determined but this is not of 
direct relevance to what follows. 
8
 In what follows, I mainly cite Lapavitsas (2009b) as a synthesis of his and dos 
Santos’ contributions. 
9
 Note the explicit appeal to independence from production of surplus value. I return 
to financialisation and “the indifferently performing sphere of production”, below. 
10
 See Ball (1983 and 1988) and Fine (2004) for an account of its influence. 
11
 Indeed, this would appear to represent a classic application of Marx’s theory of 
landed property with slow increases in productivity complemented by higher prices to 
allow for (absolute) rent, Fine (1979). 
12
 Similarly, to illustrate the conflation of categories, not to impose this instance as 
identical, see Bhaduri (1977) for his classic study of peasant’s usurious interest 
payments as representing rent in another form (and not expanded possibilities as 
idealised by orthodox economics). 
13
 See, for example, Manning (2000). Note that my own exposure to contemporary 
exploitative credit relations derives from consumer studies where the emphasis is 
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